On 'Little Mac's' staff

 
On more than one occasion, while McClellan was visiting troops in the field, he and his escort came under artillery fire. General McClellan rode his black horse, "Daniel Webster," which, on account of the difficulty of keeping pace with him, was better known to his staff as "that devil Dan"! It was also recorded that McClellan and his escort would ride among his troops at night – a dangerous practice that ultimately cost ‘Stonewall’ Jackson his life.




"Turning from the conflict on the right, I rode down the line, toward the center, forded the Antietam and ascended the hill east of it to the large square mansion of Mr. Pry, where General McClellan had established his headquarters. The general was sitting in an arm-chair in front of the house.

His staff were about him; their horses, saddled and bridled, were hitched to the trees and fences. Stakes had been driven in the earth in front of the house, to which were strapped the headquarters telescopes, through which a view of the operations and movements of the two armies could be obtained. It was a commanding situation. The panorama included fully two-thirds of the battle-field, from the woods by the Dunker Church southward to the hills below Sharpsburg."



Antietam was the bloodiest battle in the civil war as McClellan's army attacked while the Confederates were drawn up along Antietam Creek on the Maryland side of the Potomac River, inflicting some 10,300 casualties while losing almost 12,500 men. McClellan's natural caution, his belief that he was outnumbered and some poorly co-ordinated attacks allowed Lee to defend Union attacks and withdraw to Virginia. While the rebel Army of Northern Virginia remained a significant force, southern hopes of Maryland joining the Confederacy were dashed as was the possibility of foreign intervention on their behalf. Lincoln also had the victory he needed to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

To date, a debate has raged on whether McClellan lost an opportunity to win the war after Antietam by not pursuing Lee and crushing the withdrawing Rebels. George McClellan's achievement in turning a dispirited and dishevelled Union army - as it was after the tactical 'draw' of the Battle of Second Manassas - should not be underestimated; the fact that it occurred within a two week period adds to McClellan's reputation as a superb organiser and motivator of soldiers. The President told his assistant William O. Stoddard "Well, Stoddard, for organizing an army, for preparing an army for the field or for fighting a defensive campaign, I will back General McClellan against any general of modern times—I don't know but of ancient times also." 

Furthermore, from South Mountain to Antietam, General McClellan was in direct communication with Washington. It appears from the telegraphic correspondence which was carried on between Abraham Lincoln's general-in-chief, General Henry Halleck and McClellan, that while the latter believed that General Lee's object was the invasion of Pennsylvania, Halleck could not divest himself of the notion that Lee was about to play the Union army some slippery trick by turning its left, getting between it and Washington and Baltimore, and then taking each city by a coup-de-main.The following are extracts from some of General Halleck's dispatches: 

SEPT. 14.---" Scouts report a large force still on Virginia side of the Potomac, near Leesburg, If so, I fear you are exposing your left flank, and that the enemy can cross in your rear." 
SEPT. 16.---"I fear now more than ever that they [the enemy] will recross at Harper's Ferry, or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. . . ." 

These dispatches demonstrate that it was McClellan's duty as a subordinate to move slowly and cautiously in his advance, although he believed that the whole of Lee's army was in his front. It is little wonder that he continued to be cautious after the Battle of Antietam but this caution was causing frustration among the anti-McClellan political establishment in Washington prompting President Lincoln to visit army HQ in the field on October 1st.

General McClellan says in his general report: "His Excellency the President honored the Army of the Potomac with a visit, and remained several days, during which he went through the different encampments, reviewed the troops, and went over fire battle-fields of South Mountain and Antietam, I had the opportunity during this visit to describe to him the operations of the army since the time it left Washington, and gave him my reasons for not following the enemy after he crossed the Potomac." 

In "McClellan's Own Story" he says that the President "more than once assured me that he was fully satisfied with my whole course from the beginning: that the only fault he could possibly find was, that I was too prone to be sure that everything was ready before acting, but that my actions were all right when I started. I said to him that I thought a few experiments with those who acted before they were ready would probably convince him that in the end I consumed less time than they did." 

Presidential aide William O. Stoddard wrote in one of his anonymous newspaper dispatches: "The President's visit to the army was a wise and well-advised action, and Mr. Lincoln has, no doubt, obtained from personal observation and friendly consultation with his favorite general, a far better and clearer idea of the position and capabilities of the army, than he could ever have done from the garbled and unfair reports of either the friends or the enemies of McClellan." 

Nonetheless, after the President's return to Washington on the 5th of October, Halleck sent a telegraph to McClellan that signalled the beginning of the end of his military career - "The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south."

The damage to McClellan's military progress seems to have been done by Jackson’s occupation of Harpers Ferry but more particularly, by Stuart's cavalry, constantly sniping and causing an already poorly equipped Union cavalry untold trouble. Soon the Union cavalry ran out of fit horses and McClellan was, almost on a daily basis, writing in support of his cavalry department looking for a new supply of mounts.

On at least two occasions, McClellan cites this reason for not pursuing Lee, conscious of Stuart roaming the adjoining countryside with an almost free hand. His reasoned letters caused the President to curtly respond, enquiring "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?" Again McClellan replies in detail and with good military reasoning but Lincoln appears not to realise the current state of his army and, particularly, the all important cavalry wing.

McClellan was conscious that he was being ordered to invade the Confederate States "where the inhabitants furnished to the enemy every possible assistance". He continues, in response, to state that during such an action it was imperative to have "an efficient cavalry force". In McClellan's defence, records show that, apart from the cavalry picketing the river, there were only approximately 1000 horses available for service at the time of Lincoln's response. One can’t help wondering if McClellan conversed, informally of course, to his two cavalry captains, O'Keeffe & Keogh, about what was required for the efficient operation of his mounted wing, post-Antietam.

In short, Lincoln took a chance on McClellan, needed results and a quick end to the war but his army was in no state to produce. McClellan knew this and was in the progress of rebuilding. It all happened too slowly for the politicians and ‘Little Mac’ suffered the brunt of it. He was proven correct in later years because as the Union cavalry improved, so did the Union army’s performance on the battlefield. 



His manner of leaving was also cruel; his good friend, General Burnside, came to his tent and informed him that he was taking over (illustration above taken from Harper's Weekly, 1862). McClellan was told to go home to and await orders that never came.

"Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, November 10th, 1862.

Patriotism, and the exercise of my every energy in the direction of this army, aided by the full and hearty cooperation of its officers and men, will, I hope, under the blessing of God, insure its success. Having been a sharer of the privations, and a witness of the bravery of the old Army of the Potomac in the Maryland campaign, and fully identified with them in their feelings of respect and esteem for General McClellan, entertained through a long and most friendly association with him, I feel that it is not as a stranger I assume command.

To the Ninth Army Corps, so long and intimately associated with me, I need say nothing: our histories are identical. With diffidence for myself, but with a proud confidence in the unswerving loyalty and determination of the gallant army now intrusted to my care, I accept its control, with the steadfast assurance that the just cause must prevail.

A.E. Burnside,
Major General Commanding."