"Our little success on the right is all that has been gained anywhere. This may be very important to us as the first step toward the next important movement."
Major-General Schofield, Commander, Army of the Ohio to Gen. Stoneman, June 27, 1864
Thunder on Little Kennesaw by Don TroianiSoon after the Battle of Dallas and Stoneman's fight at Allatoona Pass, Johnston had pulled back again to form a 10-mile long defensive front that encompassed three mountains; Brush Mountain, Lost Mountain and Pine Mountain, located between them. Almost two miles further behind was the Confederate strong point - Kennesaw Mountain. Towering over the landscape at 1000 feet in height, Kennesaw Mountain's base was passed by the Western & Atlantic railroad and the Rebel's vast defensive line now blocked Sherman's route to the Chattahoochee River and Atlanta. General Sherman informed his superiors in Washington of the ongoing, incessant fighting:
'The whole countryside is one vast fort, and Johnston must have at least fifty miles of connected trenches with abatis and finished batteries...As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all ready. Kennesaw...is the key to the whole country.'
Between June 10 and June 18, the Union army drove Johnston's men off the three smaller mountains and the Confederates withdrew to their consolidated position in front of the town of Marietta at the base of Kennesaw Mountain. Believing he now held the advantage of momentum but that Johnston's incessant delaying tactics had affected his men's fighting spirit, Sherman changed from his month long strategy of turning the Confederate army and ordered a frontal attack on the entrenched positions, located mainly at the lowlands south of the mountain. Keogh’s overall commander, General Schofield, Army of the Ohio, later wrote in his memoirs that he and all of the other top commanders, including ‘The Rock of Chickamauga’, Major-General George Thomas, protested against Sherman's plan. Sherman's response to their concerns was to explain that the near-suicidal attack against sophisticated breastworks and trenches was only intended '...to make a strong demonstration.'
A key part of Sherman's attack was for General Schofield's Army of the Ohio to extend the right flank of the Federal position and thin Johnston's central line of defence. This placed Stoneman's cavalry and Myles Keogh at the extreme right of Sherman's army. Schofield was ordered to exploit an advantage he had gained during fighting on June 20 near Olley's Creek. Sherman's role for Schofield appears to have been the creation of a ruse, tricking the Confederates into thinking the Union Army was trying a flanking manoeuvre far to the south of its defences. On June 26, Sherman sent an order to Schofield, requesting that one of his units:
A key part of Sherman's attack was for General Schofield's Army of the Ohio to extend the right flank of the Federal position and thin Johnston's central line of defence. This placed Stoneman's cavalry and Myles Keogh at the extreme right of Sherman's army. Schofield was ordered to exploit an advantage he had gained during fighting on June 20 near Olley's Creek. Sherman's role for Schofield appears to have been the creation of a ruse, tricking the Confederates into thinking the Union Army was trying a flanking manoeuvre far to the south of its defences. On June 26, Sherman sent an order to Schofield, requesting that one of his units:
'...throw up a hasty parapet for his guns and fire away and make all dispositions as though he intended to force a passage. Same with General Cox up where he is. It should be done to-day to induce the enemy to strengthen that flank to-night.'
At noon on June 27, and under the direct command of General Jacob Cox, Schofield's wing advanced to the crest of a ridge, a mile or so beyond Olley's Creek, and within a mile of the main road running to Nickajack Creek. The ridge was extremely rough and densely wooded. Defending this southerly ridge was a division of cavalry from the Army of Mississippi and commanded by William Hicks "Red" Jackson. It was here that Myles Keogh participated in the clash at Kennesaw Mountain as Stoneman's cavalry drove their counterparts from the forested area.
However, by this stage, Thomas' and McPherson's frontal attacks were being undertaken and tethering towards defeat. On the Union left wing, McPherson’s advance towards the northern end of the mountain resulted in 210 casualties while another attack at Pigeon Hill which cost him 317 casualties out of the five thousand men engaged. George Thomas attacked the centre of the Confederate line with about eight thousand men. The points on which his attack focused were defended with divisions commanded by Benjamin Cheatham and Patrick Cleburne, Johnston's most redoubtable generals. Unsurprisingly, given the task presented to the Union troops, the result was a total failure with Thomas suffering just over fifteen hundred casualties.
When Sherman ordered George Thomas to once again advance on the Confederate lines, he received a curt and telling response: However, by this stage, Thomas' and McPherson's frontal attacks were being undertaken and tethering towards defeat. On the Union left wing, McPherson’s advance towards the northern end of the mountain resulted in 210 casualties while another attack at Pigeon Hill which cost him 317 casualties out of the five thousand men engaged. George Thomas attacked the centre of the Confederate line with about eight thousand men. The points on which his attack focused were defended with divisions commanded by Benjamin Cheatham and Patrick Cleburne, Johnston's most redoubtable generals. Unsurprisingly, given the task presented to the Union troops, the result was a total failure with Thomas suffering just over fifteen hundred casualties.
'The Army of the Cumberland has already made two desperate, bloody and unsuccessful assaults on this mountain. If a third is ordered, it will, in my opinion, result in demoralizing this army and will, if made, be against my best judgment, and most earnest protest.
The Future of War - Trenches at Kennesaw Mountain'Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly.'
Although coming against a smaller force, Stoneman's cavalry achieved some semblance of victory in their encounter with Jackson's troops on the ridge. Schofield was quick to ensure his success was noted when he wrote to General Stoneman on the evening of the 27th:
'Thomas and McPherson have failed in their attack and have suffered heavy losses. Our little success on the right is all that has been gained anywhere. This may be very important to us as the first step toward the next important movement.'
Indeed, if Schofield had vigorously pressed home his advantage on the Union's right flank, the day's losses may have been avoided; a fact recognised all too late when he reported to Sherman that the ground he won 'seems to me more important than I at first supposed.'
Whether it was this hesitancy or a new strategy from Sherman, on July 1, McPherson was ordered to move in towards and then around Schofield in another flanking manoeuvre. That very evening, after the first hint of this movement, Johnston began his withdrawal from Marietta to positions at Smyrna, and then towards the Chattahoochee River -- just 10 miles away -- the last natural barrier protecting Atlanta. This soon allowed the Union army to march unopposed past Kennesaw Mountain into Marietta and by the night of July 4, the Confederates had had completely abandoned their lines.
Whether it was this hesitancy or a new strategy from Sherman, on July 1, McPherson was ordered to move in towards and then around Schofield in another flanking manoeuvre. That very evening, after the first hint of this movement, Johnston began his withdrawal from Marietta to positions at Smyrna, and then towards the Chattahoochee River -- just 10 miles away -- the last natural barrier protecting Atlanta. This soon allowed the Union army to march unopposed past Kennesaw Mountain into Marietta and by the night of July 4, the Confederates had had completely abandoned their lines.
If complacency and thoughts of celebrating Independence Day in comfort had entered into the minds of Keogh and his fellow cavalry officers, they were to receive a prompt reminder that the enemy was never too far away...